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Abstract 
This article focuses on the idea that intervention in the labour market through the 
suspension of labour rights and freedoms, fear and a fall in purchasing power all played 
a key role in achieving political and economic objectives in the regimes of Mussolini, 
Hitler and Stalin. However, in each of these cases, the success of this policy was not as 
had been expected. These European experiences were essential for the configuration of 
the labour framework in the Franco dictatorship. The iron-fisted control of the labour 
market came to Spain through legal texts and institutions that were in many cases a 
blatant copy of those applied in Italy and Germany. In spite of the ideological distance 
between them, we can also find some common traits with Stalin’s labour policies. The 
results obtained were even worse for Spain, and the negative effects on the economy 
were more serious, due to the greater longevity of the Spanish dictatorship. 
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Dictatorship was a common phenomenon in the 29 states that comprised Europe during the 
interwar period. In 1920, all but three European countries could have been described as 
democracies, as they had a parliamentary system with elected governments, a variety of 
parties and guaranteed individual freedoms. However, on the eve of the outbreak of the 
Second World War, at least 16 countries had succumbed to dictatorship and, by the end of 
1940, only five democracies remained intact: the United Kingdom, Ireland, Sweden, Finland 
and Switzerland.1 Not all the dictatorships of this time fit into the same paradigm. Generally 
speaking, Gregory M. Luebbert distinguishes between traditional dictatorships and those 
others of a more revolutionary nature. The traditional ones did not have an ideological content 
– except for nationalism – and aimed to preserve the privileges enjoyed by the elites prior to 
the First World War. They maintained limited representative institutions and tolerated the 
existence of socialist parties and trade unions that had their hands tied, provided that they did 
not represent a threat to those in power. This domestication was possible due to the relatively 
small size of the working class. The more revolutionary dictatorships would be represented by 
the countries where fascism, Nazism or Bolshevism triumphed. These were ideologies of a 
revolutionary nature that found a good breeding ground in the economic crisis, in the class 
struggles between capitalists and workers and in the political tensions generated by the 
breakdown of the nineteenth-century world order, the creation of new states and the adoption 
of new electoral systems. Their proclamations were supported by the media, paramilitary 
organisations and mass demonstrations held to attract and win over public opinion.2 
Within the second group, the regimes of Mussolini (1922-1943), Hitler (1933-1945) 
and Stalin (1928-1953) stood out. There were clear differences between them, not only in 
their ideological bases – from the far right to the far left – but also in how they had come to 
power (whether by democratic means or not), in how long they remained in power and in 
their economic results. Nevertheless, the three regimes were characterised by their ambition to 
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put an end to class struggles and social turmoil and secure the subordination of the workers to 
the interests of the state.3 Control of the labour market was the key to attaining these 
objectives, and for this reason it became an obsession for the dictators. One only needs to 
think that wages are the main source of income for the majority of the population and 
determine, to a large extent, the class structure and cohesion of society. These characteristics 
made control of the labour market an effective tool for achieving discipline, control and 
submission to authority. 
Starting from this context, the first part of this article aims to analyse the role played 
by labour policies in the regimes of Hitler, Stalin and Mussolini. Two key questions need to 
be addressed. First, what strategic function did labour perform in these dictatorships in a 
context in which market laws barely functioned? Second, what was the response of a labour 
market controlled by the iron fist of the state? In other words, was discipline and control the 
way to maximise labour productivity and achieve political objectives? The second part of the 
article focuses on the case of Spain during the Franco dictatorship, much less studied in the 
international historiography. Firstly, this analysis serves to illustrate how the experiences of 
the dictatorships of Hitler and Mussolini were essential for the configuration of the labour 
framework in the Franco dictatorship. In spite of the ideological distance between them, we 
can also find some common traits with Stalin’s labour policies. However, two factors obliged 
the Franco dictatorship to modify its labour strategy in the long term: on the one hand, the 
defeat of fascism after the Second World War and the integration of Spain into the strategic 
system of the western democracies under the shadow of the cold war; and on the other hand, 
the economic failure of the initial labour policy and social unrest within the country. The last 
section presents the main conclusions and reflects on the changes in labour strategy of the last 
years of the Franco regime and the effects that almost forty years of dictatorship (1939-1975) 
had on the labour market in Spain.  
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Labour as a Strategic Element in the Dictatorships of Mussolini, Stalin and Hitler 
From an overall perspective, it is difficult to make comparisons between the economic 
policies undertaken by the regimes of Mussolini, Hitler and Stalin. The three dictatorships 
emerged at different moments in time and in different economic circumstances. Hitler came to 
power after the Great Depression, while Mussolini and Stalin did so in the apparently 
prosperous 1920s. The German economy was considerably more industrial than the Soviet or 
Italian ones. During the crisis of the 1930s, the German depression was basically a collapse of 
industry prior to Hitler's rise to power, while the Russian famine of 1931-1933 was the result 
of an agricultural disaster caused by Stalin’s policy of forced collectivization.4  
In spite of the differences, there were also similarities in the methods of government of 
the three regimes. In general, like the majority of dictatorships, they prohibited political rights 
and freedoms, used coercive methods as a means of subjugation, manipulated the law and 
imposed censorship on the media, while at the same time they made use of propaganda to try 
to rally the masses. The focus of this article is concentrated entirely on labour issues, in line 
with the thesis that, for all three dictatorships, intervention in the labour market played a key 
role in achieving their political and economic objectives. Accordingly, the regimes of 
Mussolini, Hitler and Stalin ended up demonising market forces and liberal policies as 
responsible for unemployment, the economic crisis and social instability, and they sold state 
interventionism as the soothing balm of all economic and social ills. Liberalism in labour 
market management was substituted by an astute mixture of control, coercion and integration 
of the working class through three main strategies.  
First of all, control of workers’ family and working lives through discipline, the 
elimination of trade union freedoms and ideological indoctrination. A dual purpose lay behind 
this strategy.5 On the one hand, wages were dissociated from market mechanisms in order to 
reduce the labour costs of the production system and to comply with other strategic goals 
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unrelated to the welfare of the population. On the other hand, authentic worker representation 
was abolished and workers could only participate in negotiations through the official ‘trade 
unions’ that supported the regime, in a context of the prohibition of strikes and other labour 
rights. Under these circumstances, a concerted effort on the part of labour became a patriotic 
duty, while disobedience or going on strike became a crime against the interests of the state. 
The party in the USSR and the labour organisations in Germany and Italy were important 
mechanisms for the mobilisation and control of the masses. Finally, the role assigned to 
women in the different regimes also contributed to the ideological contamination and the 
control of the population, but with notable differences. The defence of the family, considered 
as a pillar of the state, was related to two typical principles of the Nazi and fascist ideologies: 
the association between the size of the population and the socio-economic and political power 
of a country; and the obsession with improvement of the race. Mussolini also restricted the 
participation of women in the labour market in order to curb male unemployment and to 
guarantee social peace. The subordinate role assigned to women in the labour market became 
more tenuous with the mobilisation of men during the Second World War, and also due to 
household coping strategies. For his part, Stalin also adopted a policy of defence of the 
traditional family in the 1930s, although without renouncing the integral role of women as 
part of the labour force required to achieve his political objectives.6  
Second, the use of violence and terror in order to guarantee a disciplined and obedient 
workforce, although at a different pace and to differing degrees. The fascist government in 
Italy used coercion and repression, although the scale of terror was less than in Nazi 
Germany. The OVRA was not the equivalent the German SS or the Soviet NKVD, maybe due 
to the fact that far less pressure was put on the workers in a situation of an overabundance of 
labour and greater popular support for the regime. The death penalty in Italy was used ‘only’ 
nine times between 1927 and 1940 and ‘only’ 5,000 people were imprisoned for political 
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motives.7 In 1933 the Nazi regime initiated a new system of special courts with Nazi judges 
that dealt with all political offences, except for crimes of high treason that were tried by the 
new People’s Court (1934), which condemned more than 12,000 civilians to death. The worst 
excesses of Nazi violence were expressed through racial extermination and the use of forced 
labour, affecting around 12 million people from invaded countries and from the persecution of 
Jews.8 In the case of the USSR, terror, massacres and political purges were applied 
indiscriminately to the country’s population under Stalin. Between 1930 and 1953 Stalin’s 
state security apparatus executed about 770,000 people. Moreover, it is estimated that about 
40-50 million people were victims of imprisonment or forced labour due to political 
persecutions in the USSR between 1917 and 1953.9 Along with the violence perpetrated by 
the state, the generalised fear of no work, hunger and penury was a great disciplinary force 
that was used systematically against workers in all three countries. 
Third, in order to persuade the working class to support the system and contribute with 
high labour productivity, it was necessary both to integrate them into the system and to get 
them to identify with the new order. With this aim, the three regimes maintained a discourse 
about the harmonisation of social classes to favour common national interests – the racial 
purity and the military might of Germany, discipline and work in the USSR or the restoration 
of grandeur in Italy.10 In this discourse, full employment – not a synonym for quality or well-
paid employment - played a fundamental role in their political strategy as guarantor of 
industrial peace, considered to be a synonym for social peace. At the same time, welfare 
policies were introduced and leisure and recreational activities were offered as tools of 
propaganda, integration and control.  
On the whole, the three regimes analysed put their faith in interventionist policies 
where the iron fist of the state destroyed the basic mechanisms of labour market functioning.11 
What were the results of these policies? The workers were the great losers in all three cases. 
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First, they were stripped of their free trade unions and their means of protest and negotiation. 
Second, they were obliged to increase their productive effort through coercion and in 
exchange for poorer wages and living conditions. In view of the harshness of the measures, 
the authorities appealed to their patriotic spirit, but the evidence makes it clear that they did 
not really identify with the regime’s discourse at all.  
In the case of the USSR, survival was ensured by working longer hours and with the 
collaboration of more members of the family. Real wages in industry slumped, falling by 
almost half during the first five-year plan (1928-1932).12 In 1937 real wages barely reached 
three-fifths of 1928 wages. The official statistics indicate that in 1952, in the twilight years of 
Stalin’s regime, the average urban wage in the USSR still had not reached the level of 1928 
wages. In parallel, the Stalinist regime exerted control over the population via a process of 
attrition, responding to any attempt at worker insubordination with repression. All resistance 
was overcome by means of this strategy, although total control over the industrial labour force 
was not attained. The ambitious planning objectives had not even envisaged problems 
stemming from the shortage of labour, especially skilled workers, because they were 
confident of a substantial increase in labour productivity. But this did not occur, which caused 
the authorities to panic, as the lack of manpower work put their economic plans at risk and 
provided workers with a certain capacity of resistance (unemployment figures: 1929: 1.7 
million; 1930: 1.3 million; 1931 (August): 0.02 million).13 
The shortage of labour also limited the repressive measures of the Nazi regime in the 
labour market (unemployment figures: 1933: 4.8 million; 1935 2.2 million; 1937: 0.9 million 
and 1939: 0.1 million).14 The problem lay in the fact that as unemployment was reduced, there 
was pressure for wages to rise and workers had fewer incentives to collaborate through 
overtime and increased productivity. Under these circumstances, the rate of job rotation shot 
up, creating production problems in some factories. Employers tried to retain the more skilled 
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workers with additional benefits, some of them outside the law, but these measures pushed up 
production costs. The abundance of forced labourers did not solve the problem due to their 
lower level of skills and productivity.15 In view of this situation, the Nazi regime responded 
with tougher measures, reinforcing the barriers against wage rises and labour mobility.16 The 
German workers, although they did not openly oppose Nazi politics and policies in a climate 
of persuasion, did not collaborate with them very enthusiastically either. Above all in the 
industrial sector, they took action through the use of defensive tactics such as undeclared or 
unofficial strikes, absenteeism or resistance to new technology or working methods, all of 
which contributed to a less efficient use of labour.17 
Mussolini did not achieve the economic success of Hitler and this was reflected in the 
unemployment figures. In Italy, underemployment in agriculture and industrial 
unemployment increased, with the latter fluctuating between 11.4-15.5 per cent of the labour 
force between 1931 and 1934 (about 2 million), while the purchasing power of wage earners 
diminished. All in all, industrial wages fell about 14 per cent between 1922 and 1939.18 
Upward pressure on wages only began when the Italian economy initiated its arms race on the 
eve of the Second World War, and military discipline was introduced in the factories. 
Complaints about low productivity and poor labour discipline were common in the 
two regimes that had a shortage of skilled labour, Germany and the USSR. The Stalinist 
system led to a poor use of the labour force, which resulted in low productivity.19 Between 
1928 and 1938 industrial production per hour barely increased 5 per cent, while between 1938 
and 1950 it remained virtually stagnant. The results were far removed from those envisaged in 
the five-year plans for two fundamental reasons. On the one hand, purges and repression 
discouraged technological advances and, on the other hand, targets called for a superhuman 
effort from a workforce with few incentives to feel identified with the system and work full 
out – apart from patriotic ideologies such as the case of Stakhanovism-. On the whole, the 
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accelerated industrialisation of the USSR during these years was due to the tremendous 
increase of the labour force rather than to an improvement in productivity. For their part, 
German industrial workers were worse paid during the Nazi period than their counterparts in 
democratic countries such as Great Britain and the United States.20 The lower wages and 
unemployment and longer annual working hours in the dictatorships of Hitler and Stalin were 
a direct result of the policies applied by their leaders.  
Generally speaking, workers had to work in hostile and increasingly demanding 
environments while losing purchasing power and the capacity to consume. Their lives got 
worse both in terms of the quality of their diets and in the availability of free time. In Italy, 
workers were confronted with an increase in unemployment and a loss of purchasing power 
which led to a 10 per cent reduction in per capita food consumption between 1925 and 1938.21 
In spite of almost reaching full employment, dietary conditions also deteriorated in Hitler’s 
and Stalin’s regimes, where the population had to endure rationing and scarcity. In Nazi 
Germany the consumption of basic foodstuffs (milk, eggs and vegetables) among the working 
classes fell between 1927 and 1937, while that of poorer quality and cheaper substitute goods, 
such as potatoes and rye bread, tended to increase.22 The annual per capita meat consumption 
also fell from 51.7 Kg. in 1929 to 48.6 Kg. in 1938. The durable consumer goods industries 
were the most affected by the German workers’ loss of purchasing power. The failure of two 
projects – the promotion of the popular car and the launch of TSF receivers – clearly 
illustrates the limitations of the internal market. This situation was accepted by the workers in 
a climate of discontent, but where there were no notable protests due to a variety of factors: 
fear, the increase in employment and the fact that the majority of the population still had 
memories of the tough times of the Depression. In the USSR, annual food consumption fell in 
the decade prior to the Second World War from 2,783 kcal per inhabitant in 1927/28 to 2,449 
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(1933), 2,578 (1937) and 2,708 (1938).23 In terms of repression and the loss of purchasing 
power, the Soviet workers were the worst hit. 
On the whole, the labour policies applied only led to disappointing results in terms of 
productivity and the collaboration of the labour force. Control and fear did not favour 
collective protest actions, but they did demotivate workers with regard to individual 
behaviour, less and less willing to make sacrifices for their regime. In short, the workers lost 
out because they suffered the pressure of the iron fist of the state, because they lost rights and 
freedoms and because they lost purchasing power in a context of growing social inequality.24 
 
The labour market during the first decades of the Franco Dictatorship (1939-58) 
Spanish workers hardly had time to enjoy the universal suffrage, the growing participation of 
trade unions in public life and the gains that had been won in wages and working conditions 
in the 1930s.25 The failed coup d’état of 1936 led to a civil war where the democratic 
republican regime was defeated by the force of arms. Before the Civil War ended, the rebel 
government prohibited all political and trade union activity in the occupied territories, 
dissolved trade unions and political parties and seized all their property. At the same time, 
fundamental rights such as the right to form and become a member of trade unions, the right 
to strike or the right of association were prohibited, and would not be recovered until the 
1970s. The predominant role of the army in the conquest of power meant that the Spanish 
fascist party, the Falange, had less of a hold on Spanish society than the fascist movements in 
Germany or Italy that had led their party to power.26 This did not prevent the Spanish 
dictatorship from taking these countries as a model for organising the labour market.  
 First, the Fuero del Trabajo or Employment Code (1938) - almost a literal copy of the 
Italian Labour Charter - established the basic guidelines for labour relations that were to 
govern the so-called ‘New State’ and which remained in force until almost the end of the 
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dictatorship. Using the argument that market forces encouraged the class struggle and were 
detrimental to the workers’ interests, the Fuero designated the state as the supreme 
supervisory body.27 Through the Ministry of Labour, it imposed a monopolistic regime that 
regulated wages and working conditions and ensured compliance by means of inspection 
services. Meanwhile, compulsory membership of the vertical syndicate (run by the fascist 
party, Falange) left workers without any negotiating capacity. The control of the labour 
market by the Franco dictatorship was greater than that exercised by Hitler and Mussolini 
before the Second World War. This may have been due to two reasons: the fact that the 
regime considered the working class to be its main political enemy in a country that was 
socially and politically divided after the Civil War; and the dependence of the dictatorship on 
labour in order to produce in a context of technological obsolescence, a lack of capital and a 
shortage of energy. These factors may also explain why the labour legislation in Spain gave 
priority to order and a disciplined workforce rather than to a skilled and productive one, 
which led to disastrous economic results. 
Second, the Industrial Tribunals created in 1938 – following the Nazi model – 
strengthened the state’s control and its powers to resolve industrial disputes between workers 
and employers. In practice, the judges mainly ruled in favour of employers’ interests and 
served as a disciplinary institution to ratify employers’ punishments for serious misconduct on 
the part of employees. The same as had occurred during the first years of Nazi government, in 
postwar Spain employers and the party decided who would obtain work or keep it. However, 
this basic tool for exercising dictatorial power on behalf of the state, the party and capital was 
weakened in Germany by the regime’s policy of rearmament and the need for skilled labour. 
In Spain, on the contrary, workers barely had any capacity to exert pressure in the immediate 
post-Civil War period and were subject to the authority of employers, who enjoyed extensive 
powers within the company. 
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As a result, gangs of workers who were troublesome or who had a suspect political past 
were purged and strikes were declared to be crimes of disobedience or rebelliousness and 
tried by military courts. There were at least 700,000 trials held by the Tribunal of Political 
Responsibilities that led to between 130,000 and 150,000 executions in the post-Civil War 
period.28 The penalties that could be imposed under this law included the death penalty, 
prison, professional disqualification, monetary fines or the expropriation of property or 
belongings. There were 233,373 political prisoners in 1940, and a decade after the Civil war 
had finished there were still 36,127.29 In 1961 there were still 15,202 political prisoners in 
Spanish prisons. Disciplinary dismissal became a cheap and quick way for getting rid of 
troublesome or ‘awkward’ workers. The suffocating atmosphere of vigilance, the ideological 
and moral persecution, and the harsh punishments that the Spanish population was subjected 
to for decades allow us to establish certain similarities with the methods of repression used by 
Stalin.  
The war, exile and repression brought about a considerable loss of skilled workers in the 
labour market. In the light of the shortage of specialised workers, it was necessary to put a 
stop to the purges and apply a formula of work in return for the reduction of sentences. 
Between 1939 and 1943, more than 100,000 political prisoners gained their freedom by 
means of the reduction of their sentence through forced labour. In other cases, inmates 
worked in workshops and market gardens that had been established inside the prisons.30 These 
measures provided a cheap, docile and intimidated labour force that was used to reconstruct 
the country at a low economic, but not human, cost. On the other hand, within the labour 
market, the government reduced the skill premia to an all-time low. This undervaluing of 
human capital was in effect just one more form of repression. 
Following the Italian model, the Fuero also institutionalised the expulsion of women 
from the labour market and assigned the paternal figure the status of ‘head of the household’, 
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endowed with family and material privileges such as qualifications and a wage.31 To 
encourage women to abandon the labour market, husbands whose wives did not work outside 
the home wage were rewarded with wage supplements, or women who left their job after 
getting married were offered some kind of severance pay. The purges and the compulsory 
retirement of women from the official labour market served to offset the lack of demand for 
labour in an economic context of crisis and scarcity. Workers who suffered reprisals, married 
women and all those under twenty years of age without an official certificate of vocational 
aptitude were removed from the unemployment statistics. In accordance with these rules, the 
Ministry of Labour registered only an average of 160,000 unemployed in the 1940s and 
around 240,000 in the following decade.32 Meanwhile, low wages obliged workers to opt for 
holding dual or multiple jobs and working overtime to the limits of their physical endurance 
(Figure 1). It is noteworthy that the downward trend of real wages in Spanish industry during 
the post-Civil War period was similar to that registered in the Stalin era, the only one of the 
three dictatorships analysed that survived after the Second World War. However, in the 
USSR, real wages showed clear signs of recovery in the early 1950s, although in 1952 they 
were still below the level of 1928.33 In Spain the recovery of wages came later. The situation 
of workers during the first stage of the Franco dictatorship became so awful that in 1956 the 
Minister of Labour decreed a general wage increase. Its positive effect, however, was offset 
almost immediately by the high cost of living.34 At the same time, many women and children 
did clandestine work, which was worse paid and in abusive conditions, in order to make up 
the family budget. The activity rates among the underage population rocketed in the 1940s: 63 
per cent for children under the age of 14 and 89 per cent for youths aged 15 to 19 years. 50 
per cent of the children aged 6 to 11 years – who were prohibited from working by law – were 
not enrolled in public schools, where school absenteeism reached 29 per cent.35 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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Fear and tough working and living conditions had the desired effect in terms of 
obedience and submission, but resulted in very poor labour productivity. Workers could not 
perform well because they lived and worked in scarcity: a shortage of food, insufficient skills 
and qualifications, power cuts, a lack of raw materials and technological obsolescence in a 
framework of interventionism and autarky.36 The consumption of calories per inhabitant and 
year fell 25 per cent between 1935 and 1945 and was still below the pre-Civil War level in 
1955. The reports of international organisations such as the FAO or the UNO put the Spanish 
diet among the poorest of the principal capitalist countries (1948/49: 2,380 calories per 
individual and 1957/59: 2,590).37 Poorly nourished due to food rationing – in force until 
1953- and subjected to working days of 10 and 12 hours, many of the population could do 
little more than survive (Table 1). 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
This social panorama led to the appearance of illnesses due to insufficient vitamins, 
which coincided with the proliferation of infections stemming from the lack of hygiene and 
salubrity. Infant mortality rates rose by 33.3 deaths per thousand births between 1935 and 
1941 and epidemics of typhus and tuberculosis depleted the little strength remaining to the 
weakest. The figures are, to say the least, chilling. From 1941 to 1945, 310,470 people died of 
tuberculosis, 15,259 of typhoid, 3,615 of typhus and 7,801 of syphilis, figures that were much 
higher than those for the prewar period. Cases of malaria, pneumonia and other illnesses also 
increased dramatically.38 
The dictatorship’s wage policy also failed to stimulate worker productivity as it offered 
the possibility of supplementing wages, not as a reward for productivity or qualifications, but 
rather on the basis of good behaviour (official unionisation, obedience reports), bonuses of 
different types (cost-of-living allowance, rain, wear and tear of tools, etc.) or compliance with 
the regime’s ideological models (affiliation to the vertical trade union, wives not working 
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outside the home, getting married young, having a lot of children, etc.). Within this system, 
the internal structure of labour costs was extremely complex. In order to simplify somewhat, 
we can consider the labour costs of an industrial worker to be divided into three large 
components. First, compulsory contributions (13 per cent), which included social insurances 
(these included family allowance, old age, accidents, sickness and family responsibilities), 
official trade union fees and contributions to vocational training and to the workers’ montepío 
(similar to a friendly society). As a second component of labour costs, workers received 
supplementary benefits of a pseudo-welfare character (48 per cent), which constituted a direct 
remuneration for workers but which had absolutely nothing to do with their qualifications or 
performance, such as family benefits, a bread subsidy (to buy basic foodstuffs), a rain subsidy 
(to buy rain clothes for work), bonuses and all the other social charges. This was a method 
used by employers to top up legal wages that were insufficient for the workers’ survival. The 
system of supplements had two advantages for employers. On the one hand, the items were 
optional and discretionary, and they could be increased or cancelled by employers at any time 
without any legal hindrance. On the other hand, most of these items were linked to workers’ 
‘good behaviour’ rather than to efficiency or effectiveness at work, which guaranteed the 
control and the ‘docility’ of the working class. Moreover, it must also be taken into account 
that these items were not officially considered to be social contributions, and hence they did 
not increase employers’ contributions. The third component of labour costs was their income 
as compensation for the work they had actually done. This last component only comprised 
about 39 per cent of labour costs per worker in 1954. This wage cost structure reduced the 
price of labour in the Spanish economy – as compulsory payments were very low- and gave 
greater power to employers, who could decide whether or not to pay the voluntary items that 
made up almost half of labour costs (48%) and were indispensable for families to survive, 
thus guaranteeing control over their workers.39 
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On the whole, Spain endured a long and extremely tough post-Civil War period with 
spectacular falls in the main economic indicators and an alarming step backwards in terms of 
education and welfare in a context of deprivation of human, social and political rights. The 
1935 income level of the Spanish economy was not regained until fifteen years later and the 
income trend line prior to the Civil War was not reached until 1956. As a result, Spanish 
convergence with respect to other European countries was reduced to an all-time low in 1960 
(53 per cent).40 Within this context, and although some employers had difficulties with the 
restrictions on raw materials, energy, and technology, the employers ‘did not lose’. They 
managed to modify the country’s income structure and take a greater share of national 
income,41 and were also able to accumulate profits, favoured by the low cost of labour. On the 
basis of the figures, it seems evident that the cost of the postwar crisis was borne by the 
workers, and not only in economic terms.  
 
Conclusions: The long shadow of Francoism over the labour market in Spain 
The dictatorships of Hitler, Stalin and Mussolini allowed us to analyse the effects of the iron 
fist of the state on the labour market, focusing on the main characteristics and the results. For 
these countries, pressure on the labour market was the means used to subordinate workers to 
the state’s great strategic objectives. It appears evident that the workers were the ones 
sacrificed; they lost labour and civil rights, suffered the pressure of discipline and coercion, 
were compelled to work more and be more productive with hardly any wage incentives. 
However, as far as labour issues were concerned, the authorities did not achieve the expected 
success either in terms of collaboration, as workers did not identify themselves with the 
policies of their respective regimes, or in terms of productivity, as there were hardly any 
incentives. 
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These European experiences were essential for the configuration of the labour 
framework in the Franco dictatorship. The iron-fisted control of the labour market came to 
Spain through legal texts and institutions that were in many cases a blatant copy of those 
applied in Italy and Germany, although their practical application and results were different. 
These measures were accompanied by labour purges, political persecution and close 
supervision of the population by the state, which generated a climate of repression and fear in 
the purest Stalinist style. The difference in the case of Spain lay in the fact that the pressure 
on the labour market had no further aim than that of subjugating the workers in order to 
guarantee the success of the dictatorship and compensate employers with cheap and docile 
labour within an autarkic framework, which made it more difficult and expensive to import 
energy and other resources required for production that were in short supply in the country. 
The results were devastating for the majority of the Spanish population that silently endured a 
long postwar period rife with fear and hunger. The exploitation of Spanish workers is an 
indisputable fact, despite its lack of prominence in the international historiography.  
However, the greater longevity of the Spanish dictatorship obliged it to modify its 
strategy in the long term. The economic turnaround was consolidated with the Stabilisation 
Plan (1959), which implied the dictatorship’s acceptance of the market economy preponderant 
in the western world. The initiative did not respond to any ideological change, but rather was 
encouraged by international organisations and was met by strong internal political 
opposition.42 Starting from the 1960s, there were many changes in the country’s economic 
policy. Employers benefited from the progressive abandonment of the autarkic policy that had 
been in force in previous years. Growing imports enabled the gradual replacement of old and 
obsolete machinery used in industry up to that time and an increase in the rate of 
capitalisation. Development was financed through the accumulation of internal capital, 
brought about by the increase in capital income compared with labour income during the 
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preceding decades, and through external financing (emigrants' remittances, foreign currencies 
from tourists and direct investments). The Spanish GDP grew at an annual average of around 
7 per cent between 1960 and 1975, the period of greatest economic expansion in Spain’s 
history.43 The creation of employment was much more modest with an average annual rate of 
0.6 per cent, while the population was growing at an annual rate of 1.2 per cent. The intensive 
industrial growth in terms of capital was incapable of absorbing the growth of the active 
population and the rural exodus of at least five million people, a result of the crisis in 
traditional agriculture. The apparent balance in the labour market was obtained during these 
years thanks to emigration, since nearly two million Spaniards migrated to work officially in 
European markets.44 
The fact that this economic success occurred under a dictatorship brought with it serious 
deficiencies for the country, above all in terms of social and political rights, efficiency and 
welfare. For thirty years Spanish workers lost out on the growing power and influence of the 
trade unions, the advances in women’s rights and the unprecedented expansion of the welfare 
state that characterised the golden age of capitalism in European democracies. Quite the 
contrary, Spain was a controlled society during these years, conditioned by fear of the 
dictatorship’s permanent vigilance and ideological contamination. So, how did the labour 
market, which was still heavily regulated, adapt to the new requirements of the rapid and 
intensive Spanish development? 
The labour market began its expansion of this period with the law of 24 April 1958, on 
trade union collective agreements, which opened the way to collective bargaining under the 
supervision of the dictatorship, as it took place within the vertical trade union. The legislative 
change was the result of various pressures. Employers were demanding a system of wage 
setting linked to improved productivity. Meanwhile, illegal strikes had started to become 
widespread in industrial areas, becoming a threat to the country’s internal stability. It must 
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also be borne in mind that the old system of wage setting controlled by the state was complex 
and unsustainable from a bureaucratic point of view, and detrimental to the country’s 
economic recovery, as it did not favour either internal demand or improved productivity. 
The changes introduced by the law of 1958 were limited for two reasons. On the one 
hand, the capacity of workers and employers to exert pressure remained extremely uneven 
within a legal framework where political parties, free trade unions and strikes were all 
prohibited. On the other hand, the Ministry of Labour maintained and used its capacity to 
impose sanctions, by means of norms of obligatory compliance (NOC), which enabled it to 
impose its working conditions if the agreements reached were not to its liking. Between 1960 
and 1975 the dictatorship applied a total of 1,858 NOCs, which meant that the bilateral 
negotiations between workers and unions were effectively worthless.45 Its iron fist made itself 
apparent in November 1967, a few months after the trade union elections of 1966, which had 
seen heavy participation by workers and the victory of members infiltrated from clandestine 
trade union organisations such as the Workers’ Commissions (Comisiones Obreras or 
CCOO).46 In these circumstances, the government interrupted the negotiating process and 
froze wages for a time in a context of increasing social conflict in the form of strikes and 
collective demands. 
Driven by collective bargaining and restrained by the limitations imposed by the 
norms of obligatory compliance, real wages in Spain increased at an average annual rate close 
to 7.8 per cent between 1964 and 1975. Far from what it might seem, this rise turned out to be 
quite modest, if we take into account the loss of purchasing power accumulated in previous 
decades and the overall performance of the economy. The available figures reveal that the 
increase in industrial productivity was always greater than the rise in real wages during this 
period.47 At the same time, earned income fared worse than income from capital, which 
confirms that workers benefited less from the economic prosperity of these years. In 
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particular, the total wage bill as a percentage of national income dropped from 51.3 per cent 
in 1966 to 50.1 per cent in 1972 in a period when the number of wage earners increased.48  
Overall, employers managed to control wage increases, profit from the population’s 
greater purchasing power, and progressively link wages to individual productivity by means 
of signing collective agreements. On the other hand, the living conditions of workers 
improved compared with previous decades, as a result of the increase in wages and the 
possibility of working overtime or in various jobs. In 1965, the Labour Force Survey 
indicated that at least 16.4 per cent of Spain’s active population was working more than 60 
hours a week, while the National Statistics Institute estimated an average of 4.6 hours of 
overtime in its wage surveys.49 In general, economic progress enabled the widespread hunger 
among the population to be eradicated, although large areas of poverty remained, above all in 
the countryside and in working-class neighbourhoods. However, Spanish workers continued 
working in tougher conditions than their European counterparts with a longer working day 
and lower wages. This was compatible with improvements in the patterns of food 
consumption and the expansion of durable consumer goods.50 
The death of Franco (1975) and the transition to democracy entailed a progressive 
recognition of civil and labour rights (the right to form trade unions, the right to strike etc.), 
while, at the same time, the state lost part of its negotiating capacity to the two parties directly 
involved, employers and trade unions. But the labour relations inherited after almost forty 
years of Francoism put a very heavy burden on the internal functioning of the labour market. 
Since then, the reform of the labour market has become one of the central issues of different 
Spanish governments, above all in times of crisis, where the ‘rigidities’ inherited from the 
Franco regime appear as the main ‘culprits’ of the poor results of the Spanish economy in 
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Source: Wages in Italy from Zamagni, La dinamica, 335; in Germany from Gerhard Bry, Wages in Germany; in 
USSR from Chapman, Real Wages, 145. Wages in Spain on the basis of the wage database of the Consejo 
Superior de Cámaras de Comercio, Industria y Navegación. The figures refer to wages paid for work done, 
without benefits or any other social supplements, per standard work day, without overtime. Weighting of the 
wages of skilled and unskilled workers comes from the National Statistics Institute INE, Censo de población de 
España. Madrid: INE, 1959 and INE, Encuestas de población activa (compiled from the FOESSA reports for 
1966 and 1975). In order to deflate wages, the price index from Vilar, Los salarios, 137, has been used. Note: 
This comparison only intends to show the wage trends in the different dictatorships in the long term, as the 
wages of each country have been calculated in a heterogeneous manner. 
 
Table 1. Monthly family budget in the post-Spanish Civil War period  
(in nominal pesetas) 
Budget Items 1936 1942 1950 1956 
Rent 50 50 100 150 
Food 201 1.452 1.316 1.473 
Clothing 40 120 290 476 
Various 65 125 327 681 
Total cost of living (Pesetas) 356 1.747 2.033 2.780 
Cost of living index (1), base 1936=100 100 491 571 782 
Calculated normal income 428 600 1.596 2.372 
Income index (2), base 1936=100 100 140 373 554 






























































































Source: On the basis of Memorias de la Cámara Oficial de Comercio, Industria y Navegación de Sabadell 
(1943-1963). Budget calculated for a family consisting of a married couple of resident skilled workers in the 
textile industry with two children. The total family income is accounted for in the income section: the official 
wage received, overtime, bonuses and other supplements. In the expenditure section, the prices of goods on the 
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